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Contingency and Universalism in
State Separation of Powers
Discourse
Robert A. Schapiro*
The recent increased interest in state constitutions has fo-
cused on the individual rights portions of state charters.' In this
context, a central question has been whether provisions of the
state constitution should be interpreted differently from provisions
of the federal Constitution that contain the same or similar lan-
guage. State courts clearly have the power to diverge from federal
doctrine in construing their states' constitutions, 2 but the appro-
priateness of such independent interpretation has occasioned wide-
spread debate. Courts and commentators often take federal law to
be the presumptive benchmark and seek to specify the conditions
justifying deviation from federal precedent. In line with this
privileging of federal doctrine, studies confirm that in construing
their states' constitutions, state courts frequently defer to federal
case law and seldom deviate from federal analysis. 3
As this symposium helps to make clear, state constitutions
contain much more than substantive protections of individual
rights. State constitutions, like the federal Constitution, also em-
* Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. My thanks to the
Roger Williams University School of Law, the Roger Williams University Law Re-
view, and the participants in the Symposium on Separation of Powers in State Con-
stitutional Law. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Professor William
Buzbee and for the skilled research assistance of C. Shane Keith and of Terry
Gordon and Will Haines of the Emory Law School Library.
1. See Honorable Stanley G. Feldman & Michael D. Blanchard, Perspectives:
Foreword, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1491, 1493 (1998); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Fed-
eralism in Perspective, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1097, 1097 (1997).
2. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 548 (1986).
3. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
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body structural safeguards of liberty, such as the separation of
powers. As I will explain, because of significant distinctions be-
tween separation of powers and individual rights jurisprudence,
one would expect less deference by states to federal separation of
powers doctrine. Contrary to this expectation, however, federal
precedent sets the terms for much state separation of powers de-
bate, and federal principles provide a presumptive standard for
state constitutional decisions. This essay offers an analysis and a
critique of the powerful influence that the federal Constitution ex-
erts over state separation of powers doctrine.
I argue that the community model of state constitutional inter-
pretation helps to explain the appeal of federal doctrine. The com-
munity model posits that a constitution represents the deepest
sentiments of a particular community. According to this model,
the community both guides the interpretive process and legiti-
mates a court's exercise of judicial review. Conversely, the absence
of such communal sentiments renders constitutional interpreta-
tion impossible. Under the community model, then, the validity of
independent state constitutional interpretation rests on the exist-
ence of unique state values. A distinctive state community of value
is necessary to provide a validating referent for the interpretation
of the state constitution. 4 In view of the assumptions of the com-
munity model, attempts to craft an independent interpretation of
separation of powers provisions face substantial obstacles. Separa-
tion of powers issues provide an unlikely locus of distinctive com-
munal sentiment. Whatever the validity of arguments concerning
distinctive state traditions in the area of individual rights, distinc-
tive state values concerning second-order principles, such as the
separation of powers, are even more elusive. Even if a love for the
outrageous or bizarre justifies a robust interpretation of the New
York Constitution's protection of free speech,5 it is more difficult to
argue that the particular character of Rhode Islanders requires a
specific method of achieving the goals of avoiding tyranny or ensur-
ing effective governance. Separation of powers discussions often
focus on the structures appropriate to regulate universal features
of human nature. Such discourse does not lend itself to arguments
based on unique state customs and traditions. Under the commu-
4. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional
Law, 84 Va. L. Rev. 389, 398 (1998).
5. See People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1337 (N.Y. 1992).
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nity model of constitutional interpretation, then, separation of
powers issues cannot easily support independent interpretation of
state constitutions.
Having examined the reasons for the deference to federal sep-
aration of powers doctrine, this essay describes the flaws in this
presumptive adoption of federal precedent. Elsewhere I have criti-
cized the theoretical foundations of the community model. 6 Here, I
focus on the consequences of this model for construing separation
of powers principles. My argument will be that the presumption of
following federal separation of powers doctrine leads to distorted
and unsatisfying efforts at state constitutional interpretation. The
kinds of dangers that the separation of powers seeks to prevent
take on very different forms in different governmental systems.
Tyranny and effective governance are contingent concepts, varying
with the particular needs of a specific political configuration.
Moreover, separation of powers doctrine, itself, must shift over
time to ensure that this important constitutional principle contin-
ues to keep pace with the evolving needs of the polity. Neither fed-
eral doctrine, nor a state's own past practices, provide a
dependable interpretive beacon.
Part I briefly examines the debates concerning whether courts
should interpret the individual rights portions of state constitu-
tions independently of the federal Constitution. Part II explores
the prominence of the federal model in state separation of powers
jurisprudence. Part III turns to the current separation of powers
controversy in Rhode Island and illustrates how the federal Consti-
tution shapes the legal arguments employed by advocates in that
dispute. Finally, Part IV argues that the contingency of separation
of powers concepts renders suspect the wholesale adoption of fed-
eral doctrine. Similarly, a state's own past practices may provide
insufficient guidance in applying separation of powers principles to
the changing exigencies of the state political system.
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS MODEL
The "new judicial federalism" has focused on the individual
rights guarantees in state constitutions. 7 These provisions gener-
ally mirror the federal Bill of Rights. The advocates of the new
6. See Schapiro, supra note 4, at 428-30, 440-56.
7. See Tarr, supra note 1.
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judicial federalism urge state courts to give independent interpre-
tation to these rights provisions, rather than assuming that their
charters have the same meaning as the federal Constitution.8 De-
spite the hopes of the new judicial federalism's proponents, federal
law has continued to provide the presumptive starting point for
state constitutional analysis, and in interpreting state constitu-
tions, courts generally adhere to federal doctrine.9 One can per-
haps debate the level of independent interpretation, but the
federal Constitution undeniably exerts a strong hold on state con-
stitutional interpretation.10 Theoretical, pragmatic and institu-
tional concerns all help to explain the deference to federal
doctrine.1
8. See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Ju-
dicial Federalism's First Generation, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. xiii, xiii-xxii (1996)
(describing the history of new judicial federalism). Prominent advocates of the
new judicial federalism include Judge Hans Linde and Professor Williams. See,
e.g., Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, in Devel-
opments in State Constitutional Law 273, 294-95 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985);
Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 353 (1984).
9. See Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice 158 (1991);
Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions,
and Judicial Policymaking, 16 Just. Sys. J. 37 (1992) (finding extensive state court
reliance on federal law); Susan P. Fino, Judicial Federalism and Equality Guaran-
tees in State Supreme Courts, 17 Publius: J. Federalism 51 (1987) (same); James A.
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761,
780-84 (1992); Barry Latzer, Into the '90s: More Evidence that the Revolution Has a
Conservative Underbelly, in 4 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 18
(1991); Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution," 74
Judicature 190 (1991); G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial
Federalism, 24 Publius: J. Federalism 63, 74-77 (1994) (summarizing research
finding limited state court reliance on state constitutions); Tarr, supra note 1, at
1114-17 (same); see also Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incor-
poration Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights
Decisions, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 317, 322-39 (1986) (discussing models of "post-incor-
poration judicial review"); Peter J. Galie, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation:
The New York Court of Appeals' Search for a Role, in 4 Emerging Issues in State
Constitutional Law, supra, at 225, 226-33 (discussing models of state court defer-
ence to federal doctrine).
10. See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 Temp. L. Rev.
1169, 1170 n.3 (1992) ("In state constitutional law.., the legitimacy issue is how
to justify state judges' divergence from the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of analogous federal constitutional provisions.").
11. The following discussion of the attractiveness of federal doctrine draws on
my account in Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law. See
Schapiro, supra note 4, at 419-27.
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A. Attraction of Federal Doctrine
A common assumption of legal theory is that a constitution
serves as the embodiment of the distinctive values of the corre-
sponding polity. Constitutional interpretation involves locating
and articulating those values. 12 From this theory it follows that
the state charter can provide an authentic source of constitutional
meaning only if the constitution rests on a distinctive state com-
munity. The absence of state community would deprive the state
constitution of its validating referent.' 3 Under this model of con-
stitutional interpretation, if the state and federal provisions con-
tain the same or similar language, the meaning of the state
constitution should diverge from the federal only if the state com-
munity differs from the national community. Unique state values
are necessary to ground independent interpretation of the state
constitution. The existence of a distinctive state community, how-
ever, cannot be taken for granted. Nationalizing forces threaten to
render state boundaries irrelevant as demarcations of value. 14
Under the community model, therefore, the declining significance
of state identity undermines the possibility of independent state
constitutional interpretation.
In addition to the theoretical obstacles to independent inter-
pretation posed by the doubtful status of state community, other
pragmatic and institutional factors support adherence to federal
precedent. The federal Bill of Rights has spawned a vast body of
decisional law filling in the abstract individual rights guarantees
of the federal charter. Federal doctrine may involve complex fea-
tures, but the substantial body of precedent helps to clarify many
issues. If state courts follow federal doctrine, they can make use of
these precedents. Because the federal individual rights guaran-
tees apply directly to the states, a huge volume of decisions exist
concerning the permissible conduct of state officials. Deviating
from federal precedent presents the daunting task of pursuing a
new, uncharted course. Even without wholesale adoption of fed-
eral law, state courts still could make use of the precedents as per-
12. See id. at 418 (citing sources).
13. See James A. Gardner, What is a State Constitution?, 24 Rutgers L.J.
1025, 1025-26 (1993).
14. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 827-30; Gardner, supra note 13, at 1048-50;
Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Harv.
L. Rev. 1147, 1148-50 (1993); Linde, supra note 8, at 292-93.
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suasive authority, but substantial resources would be devoted to
deciding which decisions to follow. Adhering to federal law means
that decades of case law can be taken off the rack, without the
cumbersome process of special tailoring. A ready-made source of
legal explication is the incorporation doctrines's gift to state consti-
tutions. Further, state courts are intimately familiar with federal
doctrine because so much federal law, particularly in the criminal
context, is applied in the first instance by state courts. Independ-
ent interpretation requires leaving the familiar and finely reticu-
lated web of federal precedent.
Not only state judges, but other state officials too, must com-
prehend constitutional standards. Particularly in the area of po-
lice procedure, the federal Constitution imposes many, often
complex, strictures on official action. Government officers must
learn and understand what the Constitution requires. Police of-
ficers must know when they are permitted to search a car and
when they must cease questioning a suspect. These issues arise
daily, and officers must make rapid decisions without benefit of
legal counsel. Assimilating state to federal doctrine ensures that
state officials need learn only one body of law. Deviation from fed-
eral precedent would impose additional, potentially confusing re-
quirements on officials. Ensuring uniformity in state and federal
law facilitates officials' understanding and obeying the constitu-
tional requirements.
Deferring to federal doctrine serves a related, institutional
purpose as well. Because the federal Constitution binds the states,
interpreting the state constitution in lockstep with the federal rep-
resents a kind of judicial passivity. State judges must enforce the
federal protection of individual rights, and state officials must com-
ply with federal constitutional dictates. A different state constitu-
tional standard can only impose additional limits on official
conduct. By interpreting the state constitution to mean the same
as the federal, state courts give the maximum possible deference to
the state executive and legislative branches. Adherence to federal
doctrine thus represents a type of judicial restraint, a refusal by
courts to place further restrictions on governmental actors.
B. Interpretive Implications of the Deference to Federal Doctrine
The presumptive deference to federal doctrine has profound
consequences for the interpretation of state constitutions. To jus-
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tify independent interpretation, courts feel obligated to highlight
distinctive features of state culture. Arguments for independent
interpretation become celebrations of difference. For example,
when deciding to interpret its free speech guarantee more broadly
than the federal First Amendment, the Texas Supreme Court ex-
tolled "the unique values, customs, and traditions of our citi-
zens." 15 The court noted with hostility that some scholars had the
temerity to deny that states had distinctive characters. The court
singled out for attack an article written by Professor James Gard-
ner that questioned the concept of state distinctiveness. The court
asserted:
When contrasted with the just pride that our citizens feel in
being Texans, perhaps this very writing by an Associate Pro-
fessor at the Western New England College School of Law
demonstrates how truly diverse this nation remains. Texans
value our institutions and heritage, and our citizens would
certainly dispute that their concerns are identical to those of
the people of Rhode Island or North Dakota. 16
In support of its claim for a unique Texas free speech tradition, the
court recited historical episodes in which heroes of the Texas past
had demonstrated a fearless devotion to free expression, even in
the face of great personal risk.17 The tradition of such courageous
outspokenness, the court asserted, justified interpreting Texas's
free speech guarantees more broadly than those contained in the
federal charter.
Three justices rejected the majority's decision to interpret the
Texas Constitution more expansively than the federal. These jus-
tices, though, accepted the premise of the majority. They agreed
that distinctiveness provided a necessary and sufficient condition
for deviating from federal doctrine. 8 However, they asserted that
the particular right at issue, freedom of speech, could not properly
be claimed as a Texas treasure. Rather, the value "transcend[ed]
15. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992).
16. Id. at 16 n.33. Though unexpectedly apt for purposes of this Symposium,
the court's choice of geographic comparisons has intrigued me. Was Rhode Island
chosen because its position as the state with the smallest area contrasted nicely
with Texas's distinction as the largest of the contiguous states? Or was Rhode
Island selected for its proximity to Professor Gardner's academic home in (West-
ern) New England?
17. Seeid. at7&n.5.
18. See id. at 38-39 (Hecht, J., concurring in judgment).
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state lines."19 Because Texas did not demonstrate a unique con-
cern for freedom of expression, these justices concluded, the Texas
Constitution should not be construed more broadly than the fed-
eral First Amendment. 20
A similar debate arose when the New York Court of Appeals
contemplated whether to interpret the search and seizure provi-
sion of the state constitution more broadly than the Fourth
Amendment.21 The majority justified deviation from federal doc-
trine by citing New York's traditional "tolerance of the unconven-
tional and of what may appear bizarre or even offensive." 22 The
opinion occasioned a dissent rejecting the asserted New York tradi-
tion, while leaving unquestioned the premise that only distinctive
features of the state could justify diverging from federal doctrine. 23
As these opinions indicate, the federal Constitution exerts a
strong and not always salutary influence on state constitutional
interpretation. Although judicial and academic arguments for
state distinctiveness are colorful and provocative, they tend not to
be wholly persuasive. The attempt to prove a unique state charac-
ter leads courts into rather broad and unconvincing generaliza-
tions about the history and culture of a state. 24 If the hunt for
distinctive state values proves unavailing, then courts defer to fed-
eral precedent, robbing the state constitution of independent sig-
nificance. Whatever the attractiveness of federal doctrine, the
assumption that the state constitution does not merit independent
19. Id. at 33 (Hecht, J., concurring in judgment).
20. See id. (Hecht, J., concurring in judgment).
21. See People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
22. Id. at 1337.
23. See id. at 1350-55 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Other commentators, too,
have questioned the assertion of a distinct New York tradition of tolerance. See
Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, People v. Scott & People v. Keta: "Democracy Begins in
Conversation," 58 Brook. L. Rev. 1279, 1350 (1993) ("The court of appeals's out-of-
context invocation in Scott of New York's 'traditional' acceptance of the bizarre and
offensive [is] a dubious proposition that might well surprise the residents of, say,
Elmira .... ."); Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitu-
tionalism: The 4Vew York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled Decisionmak-
ing, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 273, 276 (1996). Professor Gardner points out that some
of the United States Supreme Court's most significant free expression cases in-
volve striking down New York laws restricting speech. See James A. Gardner,
Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State Con-
stitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1219, 1225-
26 (1998).
24. See Schapiro, supra note 4, at 411-14.
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interpretation seems an unwarranted abdication of a court's inter-
pretive duty.25 Presuming that the state constitution adds no pro-
tection to the federal baseline seems especially odd in states, such
as Rhode Island, in which the state constitution contains a specific
assertion of interpretive independence: "The rights guaranteed by
this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States."26
Even when courts break out of the community interpretive
model, the pull of the federal Constitution remains powerful. As
an alternative to citing distinctive state values to justify independ-
ent interpretation, courts sometimes rely on specific textual or his-
torical differences between the state and federal charters.27 The
perceived need to justify divergence keeps courts focused narrowly
on particular markers of difference, rather than relying on broader
structural or explicitly value-based approaches. 28 The anxiety
over deviating from federal doctrine limits the interpretive
horizons.
II. INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
As in the individual rights area, the federal Constitution ex-
erts a strong influence in the interpretation of separation of powers
provisions of state constitutions. As Professor Devlin and Profes-
sor Gardner, in particular, have pointed out, state courts often rely
heavily on federal precedent and modes of analysis in addressing
the distribution of powers under state constitutions. 29
25. See Hon. James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The
Legitimacy of Independent State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 Alb. L. Rev.
1507, 1520 (1998).
26. R.I. Const. art. I, § 24.
27. Some courts employ a "criteria" or "factors" approach that focuses on a
variety of potential differences between the state and federal constitutions, includ-
ing text and history. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982)
(Handler, J., concurring); see also Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme
Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State
Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1015, 1021-64 (1997)
(discussing criteria approach).
28. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 1152; G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and
State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 Rutgers L.J. 841, 848-50 (1991).
29. See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of
Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Func-
tions, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1205, 1219-21 (1993); James A. Gardner, The Positivist
Revolution That Wasn't: Constitutional Universalism in the States, 4 Roger Wil-
liams U. L. Rev. 109 (1998).
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A. Prominence of Federal Doctrine
State courts clearly recognize that federal precedent does not
bind them, but they frequently adopt it nevertheless. The
Supreme Court of Washington illustrated this position in its recent
decision in State v. Blilie.30 The court stated: "When separation of
powers challenges are raised involving different branches of state
government, only the state constitution is implicated. However,
this court relies on federal principles regarding the separation of
powers doctrine in interpreting and applying the state's separation
of powers doctrine."31 The Supreme Court of Missouri demon-
strated perhaps an even greater regard for federal authority in re-
lying on a concurring opinion of the United States Supreme Court
to explain its separation of powers holding.32 Confronted with a
state statute authorizing legislative audits of executive agencies,
the Missouri court advised that the challenged provisions "violate
article II, section 2 in each of the ways Justice Powell describes in
Chadha."3 3 Similar statements abound in the decisions of other
states.34
30. 939 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
31. Id. at 693 (citations omitted).
32. See State Auditor v. Joint Comm'n on Legislative Research, 956 S.W.2d
228, 231 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
33. Id.; see also City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995)
(relying on separation of powers principles articulated in Justice Powell's concur-
rence in Chadha). The Missouri Supreme Court's reference to "Article II, section
2" presents something of a puzzle. Article II of the Missouri Constitution contains
no section 2. See Mo. Const. art. II. The intended reference is likely section 1 of
Article II, the separation of powers provision of the Missouri Constitution. See Mo.
Const. art. II, § 1. Chadha does discuss Article II, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, but the Missouri Supreme Court does not appear to hold that the
statute violates the federal Constitution.
34. See, e.g., Ex parte Jenkins, Nos. 1961520 & 1961531, 1998 WL 399866, at
*32 n.21 (Ala. July 17, 1998) (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Of course, the separation-of-powers decisions of federal courts do not control the
application of this principle in cases based on the Alabama Constitution. Because
the concept has the same genesis, however, whether applied in the court system of
the United States or in the court system of Alabama, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court are highly persuasive."); National Paint & Coatings Ass'n Inc. v.
State, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("California separation of
powers analysis essentially follows the federal framework."); Quinton v. General
Motors Corp., 551 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Mich. 1996) ("Although this Court is not
bound by Justice Scalia's analysis for the Court in Plaut, where, as here, state
separation of powers concerns are implicated, we acknowledge the weight a deci-
sion of the highest court in the land carries."); Thomas v. North Carolina Dep't of
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Equally striking is the fact that such statements rarely occa-
sion disagreement, even among judges who dissent from the hold-
ing of a particular case. In Ex parte Jenkins,35 for example, the
Alabama Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of state
legislation that arguably reopened final judgments of paternity.36
The case raised the question whether the legislature had en-
croached on the judicial power to render final judgments, violating
the separation of powers principles embodied in the Alabama Con-
stitution.37 The court produced five opinions. The lead opinion re-
lied heavily on Madison and Montesquieu in explicating state
separation of powers doctrine.38 In holding the legislation uncon-
stitutional, the opinion also quoted extensively from the United
State Supreme Court's decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc.39 While criticizing the lead opinion in various respects, none
of the other four opinions disagreed that Plaut stated the applica-
ble separation of powers principles. 40 Similarly, in Quinton v. Gen-
eral Motors Corporation,41 the Michigan Supreme Court produced
four opinions concerning the constitutionality of legislation that al-
Human Resources, 478 S.E.2d 816, 822 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("This commitment to
the principal [sic] of separation of powers exemplified in our State constitution is
virtually identical in practice to that shown at the federal level."), affd, 485 S.E.2d
295 (N.C. 1997); In re D.L., 669 A.2d 1172, 1176 n.3 (Vt. 1995) ("We have often
relied upon federal separation of powers jurisprudence in developing our own
."). Older statements of similar themes include State ex rel. Anderson v. State
Office Bldg. Comm'n, 345 P.2d 674, 680 (Kan. 1959) ("Turning first to the material
on the federal constitution, which we have shown to be almost identical to the
Kansas constitution as to the principle of separation of powers ... .") and In re
Opinion of the Justices, 64 A.2d 169, 172 (Vt. 1949) ("The judicial power, as con-
ferred by the Constitution of this State upon this Court, is the same as that given
to the Federal Supreme Court by the United States Constitution . . I ."); see also
Devlin, supra note 29, at 1221 n.57 (citing cases); Gardner, supra note 29 (same).
35. Nos. 1961520 & 1961531, 1998 WL 399866 (Ala. July 17, 1998).
36. See id. at *1.
37. See id. at *3.
38. See id. at *3-*4.
39. See id. at *5-*6 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
218-19, 227, 234 (1995)).
40. See id. at *11 (Maddox, J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in
part and dissenting in part) (accepting Plaut but finding it distinguishable); see
also id. at *12-*13 (Almon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concur-
ring in portion of opinion resting on Plaut); id. at *17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (relying on Plaut); id. at *22-*26, *32 n.21 (Cook, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying and distinguishing federal
cases including Plaut).
41. 551 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. 1996).
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legedly reopened final judgments.42 The lead opinion took Plaut as
its baseline,43 and while not necessarily agreeing with that opin-
ion's interpretation of Plaut, none of the other justices disavowed
Plaut as a statement of the appropriate legal standard." Adoption
of federal separation of powers doctrine is widespread and largely
unquestioned.
When courts do depart from federal doctrine, they generally do
not stray far. They commonly seek to ground their divergence on
quite specific textual differences between the state and federal
charters. Because separation of powers principles often derive
from structural inferences, rather than particular textual com-
mands,45 reliance on specific language will not generate a broadly
distinctive state separation of powers jurisprudence. If courts in-
stead noted the important structural distinctions between state
and federal governments, they would be more likely to craft an in-
dependent state separation of powers doctrine.46
A line of Kansas cases illustrates the judicial resistance to re-
lying on such broad structural differences. In Sedlak v. Dick,47 the
Kansas Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of legisla-
tion establishing a Workers Compensation Board, whose members
were chosen by private organizations. 48 Relying on federal case
law, the claimants asserted that depriving the executive of the
power to appoint the Board violated the separation of powers. 49
The court rejected the argument, citing a provision of the Kansas
Constitution that explicitly granted the legislature broad authority
over appointments. 50 This provision stands in marked contrast to
the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution, which
42. See id. at 677.
43. See id. at 683.
44. See id. at 693 (Boyle, J., concurring); see also id. at 696 (Riley, J., dissent-
ing) (accusing court of "result-oriented" reading of Plaut).
45. See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 n.23 (1991) (relying on "basic separation-
of-powers principles," rather than specific constitutional text).
46. See infra Part IV; Devlin, supra note 29, at 1226-28.
47. 887 P.2d 1119 (Kan. 1995).
48. See id. at 1125.
49. See id. at 1128-29.
50. See id. at 1130 ("[Tlhe Kansas Constitution provides that the legislature
may appoint officers not otherwise provided for in the constitution." (citing Kan.
Const. art. 2, § 18)); see also Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F. Supp. 1274, 1277-78 (D. Kan.
1979) (relying on different appointment provisions in the Kansas and federal con-
stitutions), aff'd, 639 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1980).
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confers residual appointment authority on the President and pro-
hibits legislative appointments. 51 Sedlak further contains broader
language, contrasting the enumerated powers of Congress with the
plenary power of state legislatures. 52 This kind of theoretical dis-
tinction might ground broad divergence from federal precedent in a
variety of separation of powers contexts.
A subsequent Kansas Supreme Court case, however, closed, or
at least ignored, this interpretive opening. In Gleason v. Samari-
tan Home,53 decided the year following Sedlak, the court con-
fronted a separation of powers issue arising from state legislation
that allegedly reopened judicial judgments. Citing to Sedlak, the
court asserted that the state and federal governments differed
"profoundly."54 As if frightened by the potential interpretive free-
dom granted by this statement, however, the court in its very next
sentence doubled back into the federal fold: "As to the doctrine of
separation of powers, however, the Kansas Constitution is almost
identical to the federal Constitution. The doctrine of separation of
powers is an inherent and integral element of the republican form
of government and is expressly guaranteed to the states by the fed-
eral Constitution."55 The statement reads as if the court seeks to
assert that the broad language of Sedlak has no application in the
separation of powers area, a difficult proposition to understand in
that Sedlak, itself, was clearly a separation of powers case. The
court in Gleason proceeded to address the separation of powers is-
sue by citing extensively to the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm.56
51. The Appointments Clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127-36 (1976) (per
curiam) (stating that the Constitution prohibits Congress from assuming appoint-
ment authority).
52. See Sedlak, 887 P.2d at 1129 (citing Leek v. Theis, 539 P.2d 304, 319 (Kan.
1975)).
53. 926 P.2d 1349 (Kan. 1996).
54. Id. at 1359.
55. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
56. See id. at 1360 (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 213).
19981
92 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:79
North Carolina provides another example of a refusal to rely
on an acknowledged, and seemingly significant, structural diver-
gence between state and federal governmental systems. In State
ex rel. Wallace v. Bone,57 the Supreme Court of North Carolina con-
sidered legislation providing that four members of the General As-
sembly would serve on the Environmental Management
Commission. The opinion discussed the importance of the princi-
ple of separation of powers to the federal Constitution, buttressing
its position with quotations from Alexander Hamilton and George
Washington. 58 The court then noted that North Carolina's alloca-
tion of governmental authority deviated from the standard Ameri-
can model by failing to provide for a gubernatorial veto.59 Rather
than viewing this difference as a warrant for crafting a state-spe-
cific concept of separation of powers, though, the court took the ab-
sence of veto authority as an indicator of "strictly" adhering to the
principle of separation of powers. 60 The court apparently under-
stood such "strict" adherence to mean following the lead of federal
and most state authority, notwithstanding the significant diver-
gence in veto power.61 Rejecting a more nuanced approach, the
court adopted a rigid notion of the division of governmental au-
thority and held unconstitutional the General Assembly's effort to
retain some control over the implementation of legislation. 62
B. Absence of Pragmatic and Institutional Advantages of
Following Federal Doctrine
The widespread adoption of federal separation of powers prin-
ciples might seem surprising. Key differences between the realms
of individual rights and of separation of powers would appear to
render federal authority much less attractive. One especially im-
portant distinction is that, unlike federal individual rights prece-
dent, federal separation of powers doctrine does not apply directly
to the states. This factor, in particular, means that the pragmatic
57. 286 S.E.2d 79 (N.C. 1982).
58. See id. at 83.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 84-87 (citing to several state and federal cases).
62. See id. at 88-89; see also John V. Orth, "Forever Separate and Distinct:
Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 16-17, 23-28 (1983)
(criticizing Wallace).
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and institutional benefits of following federal individual rights case
law do not apply in the separation of powers area.
The Republican Guarantee Clause63 may impose some limits
on internal state political organization,6 4 and principles of due pro-
cess and equal protection might be implicated as well. 65 The fed-
eral Incompatibility Clause 66 has not been incorporated, though,
nor has the United States Supreme Court sought to apply its gen-
eral separation of powers doctrine to state governmental organiza-
tion. As a result, not only do fewer federal precedents exist, but
state courts have little experience applying federal authority. Un-
like individual rights provisions that may arise in the course of
state criminal prosecutions, a state court would rarely have occa-
sion to grapple with federal separation of powers principles. Fed-
eral precedents do not supply a broad and familiar backdrop for
state court adjudication. With regard to separation of powers,
then, concerns for clarity supply only limited support for adhering
to federal doctrine.
For similar reasons, interpreting state constitutions in lock-
step with federal separation of powers law would not further the
cause of uniformity. Because federal doctrine in this realm does
not apply to the states, only one body of separation of powers law
will exist. Whether or not states follow the federal lead, the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine developed by state courts alone will bind
the action of state officials. Moreover, while the easy comprehensi-
bility of law may always be desirable, clarity and uniformity are
less significant in the area of separation of powers, which involves
intergovernmental relations, rather than relationships between
the state and individuals. While police officers may need to make
snap judgments about when a search is permissible, disputes
about governmental appointment powers usually can abide defini-
tive judicial determination.
63. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
64. For a collection of recent articles discussing the Guarantee Clause, see Ira
C. Rothgerber, Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law: Guaranteeing a Republican
Form of Government, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 709 (1994); see also Edward A. Stelzer,
Note, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State Court Enforcement of the Guarantee
Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870 (1993) (providing state courts with guidance in de-
ciding Guarantee Clause cases).
65. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation
of Powers, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 51 (1998) (discussing implied federal consti-
tutional limitations on state governmental organization).
66. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, c. 2.
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The unincorporated status of federal separation of powers law
also means that judicial restraint does not counsel lockstep inter-
pretation. Diverging from federal doctrine will not impose addi-
tional restraints on state officers; nor will following federal
doctrine minimize judicial regulation of other branches of state
government. To put it slightly differently, in the separation of
powers area state courts have nowhere to hide. Federal law pro-
vides no constitutional floor. Responsibility for the restrictions the
court imposes cannot be laid at the feet of the United States
Supreme Court. Morever, because of the relatively strict separa-
tion of powers principles enforced by the United States Supreme
Court, following the federal lead would mean that state courts
might well impose significant restrictions on the actions of other
state governmental actors. Deviating from federal doctrine and
adopting a more flexible approach might better advance the goal of
judicial restraint.
C. Community and Separation of Powers
Although these pragmatic and institutional factors do not sup-
port adhering to federal doctrine, the community theory of inter-
pretation suggests that the absence of distinctive state separation
of powers values will incline states to follow the federal lead.
Although the centripetal concerns of clarity, uniformity and re-
straint do not draw state doctrine toward the federal Constitution,
the difficulty in locating state-specific principles translates into a
reduced centrifugal force pulling the state out of the federal orbit
and into the realm of independent constitutional interpretation.
In the case of individual rights provisions, debates about in-
dependent interpretation focus on unique state values. It is the
distinctive features of state character that legitimate deviation
from the federal norm. Such arguments about the unique charac-
teristics of states are more difficult to make about structural prin-
ciples, such as the separation of powers. Separation of powers is a
second-order principle.67 It is not an end in itself, but a means of
achieving other ends, such as preventing tyranny and ensuring ef-
67. Cf. Quinton v. General Motors Corp., 551 N.W.2d 677, 688 (Mich. 1996)
(terming separation of powers a "prophylactic device"); Larry Alexander & Ken
Kress, Replies to Our Critics, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 923, 934-35 n.64, 941 (1997) (discuss-
ing the view of separation of powers as a second-order principle).
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ficient government. 68 The problem of separation of powers is es-
sentially a problem of technology: what is the best means for
attaining specified goals. While individual rights provisions may
represent the values of the people of a particular state, separation
of powers principles appear less subjective, more a matter of objec-
tive scientific inquiry.69 Debates about individual rights invoke
Romantic historical narratives, revealing the particular character
of the people of the state. Separation of powers debates, by con-
trast, sound in an Enlightenment faith in universal principles of
human nature, including natural human ambition and the concom-
itant need for structural safeguards. Montesquieu and Madison
could know nothing of the frontier courage of Stephen Austin or
the creative license of Greenwich Village, but they could study and
understand how government could best channel basic human in-
stincts.70 States may have developed individual cultures giving
rise to enhanced appreciation for free expression or privacy, but
the basic mechanics of governmental power have not changed since
the framers erected the federal constitutional system. Karen Fin-
ley may have been unanticipated; Huey Long was not. More con-
cretely, separation of powers may appear to be an area in which
there exists a standard American solution, owing to our shared
political heritage and the rough convergence of the tripartite state
68. See Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation 14-26 (1996) (emphasizing ef-
fective governance, as well as preventing tyranny, as goals of separation of pow-
ers); Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 388 (3d ed. 1996) (describing
efficiency and prevention of tyranny as goals of separation of powers); Devlin,
supra note 29, at 1229-32 (listing goals of separation of powers, including prevent-
ing tyranny and ensuring efficiency); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 432-33 (1987) (describing efficiency and preven-
tion of tyranny as two chief purposes of separation of powers). But cf Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine of
the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."); Devlin, supra note 29,
at 1231 & n.92 (noting that the United States Supreme Court occasionally rejects
the notion that separation of powers should promote efficiency).
69. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Wallace v. Bone, 286 S.E.2d 79, 84 (N.C. 1982)
(terming separation of powers "one of the distinct American contributions to the
science of government" (quoting State v. Bell, 115 S.E. 190, 199 (N.C. 1922) (Stacy,
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed.,
1982) ("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition .... It may be a reflection
on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature?").
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and federal political systems.71 As will become clear, I contest this
static and universalist conception of separation of powers, but such
a view helps to explain why courts would be unable to ground an
independent state separation of powers jurisprudence on distinc-
tive features of a state community.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONTROVERSY IN RHODE ISLAND
The current separation of powers controversy in Rhode Island
provides a further example of the dominance of federal doctrine
and of the limited resources available to urge deviation from the
federal model. An examination of the briefs of two of the chief an-
tagonists will help to illustrate the character of arguments in state
separation of powers disputes.
Under existing practice, the Rhode Island General Assembly
not only creates public boards and commissions, but often
designates the members of these bodies. The members may in-
clude current legislators. On November 20, 1997, the Governor of
Rhode Island, Lincoln C. Almond, requested that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adjudicate the constitutionality of such legislative
appointments. 72 This opening salvo clearly demonstrated that fed-
eral doctrine would figure centrally in the arguments about the
meaning of separation of powers under the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion. One of the questions proposed by the Governor directly in-
voked federal precedent: "Is the principle of separation of powers
contained in the Rhode Island Constitution properly interpreted in
the same fashion as it has been interpreted in the United States
Constitution with respect to appointments... ?"73 Much of Gover-
nor Almond's brief in the case explains the importance of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers as embodied in the federal
Constitution. The brief makes liberal reference to James Madison
and to the federal case law that has elaborated a federal theory of
separation of powers. 74 The basic argument of the brief is that the
current practice of legislative appointments would violate federal
separation of powers doctrine and that no reason justifies deviat-
71. Cf Dorf, supra note 65 (distinguishing between generalized concepts of
liberty and those specifically rooted in the American legal tradition).
72. See Brief for Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 1, In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
73. Id. at 2.
74. See, e.g., id. at 11-20.
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ing from federal precedent. The brief asserts: "There is no sound
constitutional basis for Rhode Island to be a sorry aberration in the
American constitutional landscape and every reason to follow fed-
eral jurisprudence and the teaching of the framers."75
The opposing position is exemplified by the brief filed on behalf
of the Majority Leader of the Rhode Island Senate, Paul S. Kelly.
This brief asserts that Rhode Island always has diverged from fed-
eral separation of powers doctrine. 76 The brief highlights the tex-
tual differences between the Rhode Island and federal charters,
but the argument relies mainly on the long-standing practice of
legislative appointments in Rhode Island. In essence, the brief as-
serts that a page of history is worth a volume of Montesquieu:
"This Court has always recognized that the authority of the Rhode
Island General Assembly is not limited to functions which might be
considered-by Montesquieu, or by Madison, or by the Rhode Island
Ethics Commission-to be 'legislative' in theory or in 'nature.'" 77
The briefs employ standard arguments of state constitutional
disputes. The Governor rests on the presumption that courts
should defer to federal doctrine absent a compelling reason for
deviation. The Majority Leader asserts that long-standing prac-
tice, including refusal to conform the state constitution to the fed-
eral, justifies continuing the state's divergent policy. Invoking an
argument common in all constitutional discourse, the Majority
Leader claims that the status quo constitutes a presumptively con-
stitutional baseline. 78 In the individual rights context, these argu-
ments are familiar, though they might well be aligned rather than
opposed. If plaintiffs assert state constitutional challenges to long-
standing practices, the defendants may well offer a dual response
that (1) the practice conforms to federal constitutional require-
ments (as it must in the case of incorporated constitutional guar-
antees) and that (2) the long duration of the practice supports its
75. Id. at 6.
76. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Honorable Paul S. Kelly, Majority Leader,
Rhode Island Senate at 24, In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Separation of
Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
77. Id. at 48.
78. The constitutionalization of the status quo is a common argumentative
move in both federal and state constitutional discourse. See Sunstein, supra note
68, at 504 (criticizing use of status quo baselines that necessarily validate existing
practices); see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366-70 (N.Y. 1982)
(justifring existing school finance system by reference to longstanding history), ap-
peal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983).
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validity. The unincorporated status of separation of powers law
allows these arguments to diverge.
Where this debate differs markedly from the individual rights
discourse is in the absence of arguments based on the unique val-
ues of the people of the state. In the case of individual rights provi-
sions, courts and commentators rely on distinctive aspects of state
history to reveal special features of state character that justify di-
verging from federal doctrine. As discussed above, separation of
powers may be viewed as less about distinctive features of the
state than about universal principles of human nature. If separa-
tion of powers is understood in this manner, state distinctiveness
may be shunned as an idiosyncratic deviation from right reason.
State history might still justify divergence from federal practice,
but such history would generally be relevant for its precedential
effect, rather than as a theoretical justification for independent
state interpretation. The history merely reveals legal tradition.
Under the community model of constitutional interpretation, such
historical arguments retain some force, but they do not enjoy the
self-validating quality of references to the ultimate matrix of con-
stitutional legitimacy-the fundamental values of the state
community.
If separation of powers history does not reflect the unique
character of the people of the state, the touchstone of constitutional
meaning under the community model, advocates of adhering to
federal authority need not dispute the existence of a distinctive
historical tradition. Rather, they can deny the normative force of
that history.79 If separation of powers is viewed as a generalized
principle of good governance, then, distinctive state history might
represent a form of pathology, rather than a shining exemplar of a
fresh and authentic perspective on constitutional principles. The
Governor's brief, for example, makes some effort to downplay the
extent of the historical practice of legislative appointments to
boards and commissions. For the most part, though, the Gover-
nor's position is that the state's peculiar history constitutes an ob-
79. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (holding one-house
veto unconstitutional, while noting long-standing history of practice); In re King v.
Cuomo, 613 N.E.2d 950, 953 (N.Y. 1993) (holding the New York legislature's long
established practice of "recalling" legislation from the Governor unconstitutional
and noting that "[tihe New York Legislature's long-standing recall practice has
little more than time and expediency to sustain it").
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ject of opprobrium, rather than veneration. The Governor's brief
concludes with the following plea for a break with the state's past:
One road leads to the broad and sunlit uplands of federal pre-
cedent, and is constructed on the basic and vital principles of
our country's founding .... The state road, on the other
hand, comes from an obscure and troubled origin ... and it
leads back into the great swamps of a political history from
which we are still struggling to emerge.80
In a reversal of the individual rights discourse, it is the very dis-
tinctiveness of the state path that renders it suspect.
These briefs illustrate the central place of federal doctrine in
state separation of powers arguments and show how in this context
historical narratives lack the self-validating force of revelations of
authentic state character. As compared with the realm of individ-
ual rights, advocates of independent interpretation of separation of
powers principles have fewer resources to justify divergence from
federal doctrine. The absence of arguments based on distinctive
state values may help to explain why states often follow federal
doctrine in this area, even though the pragmatic and institutional
concerns that helped explain deference to federal doctrine in the
individual rights realm apply quite differently. As in the individ-
ual rights area, appeals to text and long-standing practice remain
possible. As the next Part discusses, though, such sources may
provide unsatisfying guides to understanding the broad structural
principles implicated by the separation of powers.81
IV. THE CONTINGENCY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
In the remainder of the article, I contest the view that states
should align their separation of powers law with federal doctrine.
80. Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 82-83, In re Advisory Opinion (No.
97-572-M.P.) (quoting Sheldon Whitehouse, Appointments by the Legislature
Under the Rhode Island Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of the Road
Less Traveled, 1 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1996) (quotation marks omitted)).
81. My point is not that the attraction of federal doctrine renders impossible
nuanced discussion of state separation of powers questions. For example, drawing
heavily on Professor Devlin's work, see supra note 29, the Brief of the Rhode Island
House of Representatives assesses the implications of the distinctive state and fed-
eral political structures. See Brief and Appendix of the Rhode Island House of
Representatives Through Its Speaker, John B. Harwood at 42-48, In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.). Concern with
federal doctrine, however, influences the overall shape of separation of powers ar-
guments and may well distract from more penetrating structural analysis.
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First, I suggest that significant differences between states and the
federal government render lockstep interpretation questionable.
Second, I move on to the broader point that separation of powers
must be understood as a contingent principle that has different ap-
plications in different settings. Even if the general goals of avoid-
ing tyranny and ensuring effective governance could be ascribed to
separation of powers in both the state and federal systems, the
meaning of these ends and how best to achieve them will likely
vary widely. Taking doctrine created in one governmental system
and applying it in a different context will be unlikely to lead to the
best allocation of political power. Because of the changing nature
of separation of powers problems, deference to the historical status
quo also represents an inadequate response. The growth of the
modern administrative state provides the context for understand-
ing the inadequacy of either aping federal doctrine or conferring
normative authority on long-standing practice. Drawing in partic-
ular on the work of Cass Sunstein,8 2 the following discussion iden-
tifies some of the evolving separation of powers concerns and
suggests why neither the federal present nor the state past offers
reliable guidance.
A. Power and Structure in State and Federal
Governmental Systems
Federal separation of powers doctrine has been subject to
much criticism, particularly for being overly rigid and formalis-
tic,8 3 though it is sometimes faulted instead for oscillating unpre-
dictably between formalism and functionalism. 8 4 Whatever its
strengths and weaknesses, I wish to emphasize here why that doc-
trine would not be easily transplanted to a state political system.
Federal doctrine reflects in part specific textual commitments not
82. See Sunstein, supra note 68; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987).
83. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 493-94.
84. See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution,
46 Duke L.J. 679, 689-716 (1997) (discussing formal and finctional approaches to
separation of powers); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Sep-
aration-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488
(1987) (same); Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 Tul. L.
Rev. 2681 (1996) (same).
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duplicated in state constitutions.a5 More importantly, federal sep-
aration of powers principles embody particular structural impera-
tives of a specific political system. One could debate the relative
balance of power among executive, legislative and judicial
branches at the state and federal level.8 6 For present purposes, I
wish to stress a different kind of comparison between state and
federal governmental systems. Whatever the relative strength of
the executive, legislative, and judicial departments, a striking fea-
ture of the national government is the overall strength of each
branch.8 7 Because, as I will explain, separation of powers doctrine
today must focus not only on limiting certain kinds of power, but
also on ensuring the sufficiency of governmental power, the
strength of each department of government constitutes a crucial
concern.
The President controls the executive branch, and the growth of
the administrative state has endowed the executive branch with
great power.88 With vast administrative resources at their dispo-
sal, Presidents can set the country's policy agenda.8 9 The reach of
the national media affords Presidents great power to publicize and
pursue their priorities. At the same time, the United States Con-
gress enjoys broad legislative authority. The Supreme Court re-
cently has sought to remind Congress that the powers of the
national government are limited, not plenary.90 Cases like United
States v. Lopez,9 1 however, reveal the vast extent of permissible
federal regulation, even as they enforce some limits on congres-
85. The Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and Incompatibil-
ity Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, provide two salient examples.
86. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 169, 201-16 (1983) (analyzing branches of state governments).
87. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 68, at 483-91 (describing growth of execu-
tive, legislative and judicial control over government agencies).
88. See Korn, supra note 68, at 23 (citing "president's uniquely broad execu-
tive prerogative powers"); Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President 56-58 (1985);
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 210-12 (1973); Martin S. Fla-
herty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996); Stanley H.
Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in
Varied Contexts, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 440,
444.
89. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 494 (describing policy-making role of the
President).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-68 (1995).
91. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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sional activity.92 The third branch, the federal judiciary, also has
assumed broad powers. Protected by life tenure, federal judges
have confronted divisive issues of public policy. The courts' efforts
have garnered criticism,93 and some scholars have claimed that
the courts' intrusion into social policy has been ineffectual.94 The
courts, however, have acknowledged few legal limits on their au-
thority to interpret and to enforce the federal Constitution.9 5
By contrast, significant, additional checks thwart the exercise
of power by each part of state government.9 6 Executive branches
of state governments often have a more diffused assignment of au-
thority. States commonly elect several members of the executive
branch, affording independence to other executive officers in addi-
tion to the governor.9 7 This dispersal acts as an internal check on
the state executive power.98 State constitutions also place signifi-
cant substantive and procedural limits on state legislatures. To
say that the United States Congress enjoys only enumerated pow-
ers, while state legislatures exercise plenary power, would be to
emphasize theory over practice.99 The chief limitations on Con-
gress's legislative authority are the external limits established by
the Bill of Rights.' 0 0 In addition to these strictures, state legisla-
tures often face additional requirements, such as prohibitions on
92. See Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States'
Rights Movement Within The Supreme Court"?, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 663, 664-
66 (1996); Judge Louis H. Pollak, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Foreword,
94 Mich. L. Rev. 533, 550-53 (1995).
93. See, e.g., David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the
Law (1995); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (1977).
94. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? (1991).
95. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) (affirming courts'
power to ignore state taxation limits when necessary to enforce a remedy).
96. See Devlin, supra note 29, at 1225-26.
97. See The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 1998-99, at
35 tbl. 2.10 (1998); Devlin, supra note 29, at 1226-28 & n.79; Patrick C. McGinley,
Separation of Powers, State Constitutions & the Attorney General: Who Represents
the State?, 99 W. Va. L. Rev. 721, 722 (1997).
98. See Devlin, supra note 29, at 1226-28; Malcolm B. Johnson, Why We
Should Keep Florida's Elected Cabinet, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 603, 603 (1978); Mc-
Ginley, supra note 97, at 757.
99. See Friedelbaum, supra note 88, at 1421 (describing difference "in theory"
between enumerated powers of Federal Government and reserved power of state
governments).
100. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 3.1, at 166 (1997) (contrast-
ing classical formulation of limited federal powers with "reality" of broad federal
powers).
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local or special legislation or germaneness requirements. 10 1 Fur-
ther, substantive due process limits on state legislatures' economic
and social policies have outlived Lochner's demise 10 2 in the federal
system.'0 3 Finally, state courts have tended to be less assertive in
defining and enforcing constitutional rights. This reluctance may
be traceable to the courts' greater electoral accountability. 104 In-
deed, the reluctance to engage in independent interpretation of the
state constitution exemplifies the relative passivity of state courts.
Another prominent sign of the state courts' modesty is the imposi-
tion of a heightened burden for declaring acts unconstitutional.
North Dakota's supermajority requirement is aberrational,10 5 but
101. See G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical Perspective,
in Constitutional Politics in the States 3, 9-11 (G. Alan Tarred., 1996) (describing
historical evolution of restrictions on legislatures).
102. See Chemerinsky, supra note 100, § 8.2.3, at 489 (noting that West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) indicated abandonment of principles of Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
103. See, e.g., James C. Kirby, Jr., Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Reg-
ulation Under State Constitutions, in Developments in State Constitutional Law
supra note 8, at 94; Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Consti-
tutional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324, 1463 (1982); Lawrence M. Friedman, State
Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 33,
40-41 (1988); Peter J. Galie, State Courts and Economic Rights, 496 Annals Am.
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 76 (1988); A. E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitu-
tional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873, 879-91 (1976);
Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 Val. U. L.
Rev. 459, 472-74 (1996).
104. See Daniel R. Pinello, the Impact of Judicial-Selection Method on State-
Supreme-Court Policy: Innovation, Reaction and Atrophy 130 (1995) ("[Trhe data
here show the conventional wisdom of the 1980s among professional political
scientists that selection method has no meaningful impact on judicial policy is mis-
taken."); Paul Albert Kramer, Analyzing the Determinants of State Constitutional
Activism: A Search for State Court Independence in the American Federal System
158-63, 206-07 (1995) ("States with either a merit-based appointment system or
direct judicial appointment produce state courts that are more activist relative to
courts in states where justices face electoral reprisal.") (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Minnesota); see also Susan P. Fino, The Role of State
Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism 116-17 (1987) (noting the link
between courts' insulation from majoritarian pressures and their protection of mi-
nority rights); Friedelbaum, supra note 88, at 1458-59 (suggesting electoral depen-
dence ofjudges as cause of "instability" in state courts). But see Jona Goldschmidt,
Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 43-
45 (1994) (reporting studies finding little connection between selection method and
judicial decisions).
105. See N.D. Const. art. VI, § 4 (requiring concurrence of four judges to hold
legislation unconstitutional); see also Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511
N.W.2d 247, 250 (N.D. 1994) (upholding constitutionality of school finance system
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the standard that legislation must be found unconstitutional be-
yond a reasonable doubt is more common.10 6 To be sure, state
courts have asserted significant independent authority in certain
areas, especially matters pertaining to the courts, themselves. For
example, state courts have resisted encroachment on their regula-
tory authority10 7 and even have safeguarded their own budgets
under a theory of inherent constitutional authority to protect their
functioning.' 08 The absence of strict justiciability requirements in
certain states also may confer greater power on state courts.' 0 9
despite conclusion by the majority of the Court that system violated state
constitution).
106. See, e.g., People v. Geyer, 942 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Biscoe
v. Tanaka, 878 P.2d 719, 723 (Haw. 1994); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d
491, 496 (Minn. 1997); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995);
Island County v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1998); State v. Janssen, 580
N.W.2d 260, 263 (Wis. 1998). James Bradley Thayer, among others, advocated
that federal courts adopt such a heightened standard for judicial review. See
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 140 (1893); see also G. Edward White, Revisiting James
Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 48, 73-83 (1993) (discussing Thayer's proposal).
In this regard, it appears that Thayer has triumphed in state courts.
107. See, e.g., Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-56 (Ill. 1997) (holding
unconstitutional legislature's attempt to promulgate rules of judicial procedure);
Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 878 P.2d 913, 916-20 (Nev.
1994) (holding unconstitutional executive participation in judicial discipline pro-
cess); Commonwealth v. Stern, 701 A.2d 568, 570-73 (Pa. 1997) (holding unconsti-
tutional legislature's attempt to supervise conduct of lawyers); Lloyd v. Fishinger,
605 A.2d 1193 (Pa. 1992) (same); see also Murmeigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357,
1364-67 (Ill. 1997) (holding unconstitutional legislative regulation of the judici-
ary's contempt power).
108. See Felix F. Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Courts: Sword and Shield of
the Judiciary 4-5 (1994) (collecting references to definitions of "inherent powers"
doctrine); see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Nineteenth Judicial Dist., 895 P.2d
545, 547-49 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (discussing "inherent powers" doctrine); In re
1987 Essex County Judicial Budget Impasse, 533 A.2d 961, 970 (N.J. 1987) (order-
ing county to increase judicial funding by nearly $2 million).
109. For example, as the current proceeding in Rhode Island illustrates, the
courts in some states offer advisory opinions. See Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudence
of the Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode Island, 2 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 207,
213-14 (1997); see also Margaret M. Bledsoe, Comment, The Advisory Opinion in
North Carolina: 1947 to 1991, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1853 (1992) (describing the declining
use of advisory opinions in North Carolina). There would seem to be some irony in
arguing in the context of an advisory opinion proceeding that Rhode Island must
apply federal separation of powers doctrine. Federal courts are constitutionally
prohibited from issuing advisory opinions, in part because such opinions would
violate separation of powers principles. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968);
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.2, at 48 (2d ed. 1994) (stating
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The largely unfulfilled promise of school finance reform,
though, stands as a representative example of the relative weak-
ness of state courts, especially in confrontations with other centers
of state power.110 The Rhode Island case of City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun'l illustrates the reluctance of state courts to intervene in
school finance matters. In the face of claims for greater equity in
the allocation of educational resources, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court relied on separation of powers, among other grounds, in up-
holding the constitutionality of the state's property tax-based
school funding system." 2 To bolster its position, the court cited
one chapter of the long-running federal school desegregation case
in Kansas City, Missouri.' 1 3 Despite Sundlun's reference to Kan-
sas City, that very case, considered as a whole, provides an illumi-
nating contrast to state constitutional litigation. In the decision
relied on in Sundlun, the United States Supreme Court did find
that the federal district court had employed a remedy of impermis-
sible scope. 114 Five years previously, though, when considering ef-
forts to fund a comprehensive court-ordered remedy of vast
dimensions, the Supreme Court had approved a district court's or-
dering the school board to raise taxes, even in excess of the level
permissible under state law.115 That kind of aggressive judicial
enforcement of constitutional commands is rare in state constitu-
tional litigation.
The weakness of each branch of the state government provides
an important context for state separation of powers jurisprudence.
Because of the manifold human needs threatened by complex mod-
ern society, an absence of governmental power can be as great a
.separation of powers is maintained by keeping the courts out of the legislative
process").
110. See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State
Courts, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, 1082-83 (1991). At least one recent commentator
has found that state constitutional litigation may have significant effects on the
distribution of educational resources in a state. See Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five
Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judi-
cial Federalism, 32 L. & Soc'y Rev. 175 (1998). There seems little dispute, though,
that state courts have been less assertive in imposing intrusive remedies than fed-
eral courts have been in the civil rights area. See, e.g., id. at 213 (noting the small
number of "aggressive, activist decisions" in state school finance litigation).
111. 662 A.2d at 40.
112. See id. at 57-59.
113. See id. at 59 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995)).
114. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 100.
115. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1990).
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threat as a surfeit. One of the lessons of the Progressive Era and
the New Deal, legally recognized in the overruling of Lochner, is
that tyranny may have private, as well as public sources. For a
worker in an unsafe plant or for a citizen in a polluted neigh-
borhood, government regulation may represent a reprieve from the
potential abuses of ("private") power. 116 In this regard, govern-
mental inaction may lead to tyranny. 117
The challenges posed by government inaction take on different
forms in the states, given the quite different constellations of
power. To give one example, it is an old saw that "[n]o man's life,
liberty or property are safe while the Legislature is in session."""
Because of the regulatory needs of modern society, however, a
more accurate rendition might be that no person's life, liberty, or
property are safe while the legislature is out of session. And unlike
Congress, state legislatures are out of session a great deal. Adher-
ing to federal doctrine will not allow a court to take account of such
important structural differences. States might well need to adopt
innovative institutional patterns to address emerging regulatory
needs.
The modem administrative state arose because the existing
framework of government proved inadequate to create and enforce
a legal environment to meet the challenges of the growing national
economy. While answering an important need, administrative
agencies present important accountability concerns. In the federal
system, though, strong executive, legislative and judicial branches
can serve as a powerful check on regulatory bodies. In the state
system, oversight and control may need to assume different forms.
Strong administrative boards, including sitting legislators, may fill
a power vacuum, while providing a practical means of democratic
supervision.
116. See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney,
52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 683 (1985) ("The rise of the modern regulatory state results
in large part from an understanding that government 'inaction' is itself a decision
and may have serious adverse consequences for affected citizens.").
117. See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 12 & n.21, 29 (1956)
(referring to James Madison's idea of the consequences of tyranny as "the severe
deprivation of natural rights" and describing tyranny inflicted by private individu-
als); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 501-04 (describing New Deal critique of govern-
ment inaction); Sunstein, supra note 82, at 902-19 (same).
118. Gary L. Starkman, State Legislators, Speech or Debate, and the Search for
Truth, 11 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 69, 69 (1979) (quoting The Final Accounting in the
Estate of A.B., 1 Tucker (N.Y. Sur. Rep.) 247, 249 (1866)).
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B. Contingency and Historicity
The foregoing discussion of the significant differences between
the state and federal systems casts doubt on simply following fed-
eral separation of powers authority. The example of the growth of
the modern administrative state further suggests why an alterna-
tive strategy of resting on state tradition also may represent an
inadequate response to state separation of powers questions.
Preventing tyranny and ensuring effective governance may be
the chief aims of separation of powers law. The meaning of the
these goals, though, takes shape with the particular exigencies of
the relevant political system. Just as the state and federal govern-
mental systems differ greatly, so do the political structures in a
state today, as opposed to 100 years ago. Governments do more
today, and administrative agencies and other innovative bodies
have arisen in response to those needs. In Rhode Island, for exam-
ple, the number of boards and commissions more than doubled be-
tween 1936 and 1986.119 At some point, the multiplication of such
bodies may present new kinds of challenges requiring different
forms of supervision. The need to coordinate the varied agencies
and to ensure a coherent administrative agenda may require more
centralized control. Letting a dozen commissions bloom may rep-
resent a creative response to regulatory requirements. Letting a
thousand commissions bloom may produce chaos, without some
central organizing mechanism. The argument for asserting execu-
tive control over the administrative state changes when the regula-
tory framework becomes so large and complex. 120
These observations are perforce very general. Different states
will find their own solutions. Large states and small states may
face divergent challenges, and the problems will vary also depend-
ing on the particular characteristics of the state and its general
division of governmental authority. The main point, though, is
that neither today's federal doctrine, nor yesterday's state prac-
tices represent compelling sources of separation of powers
principles.
119. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 77-78, In re Advisory Opinion
to the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
120. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 509 (noting role of executive, legislature
and judiciary in supervising administrative agencies).
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V. CONCLUSION
My goal in this essay has not been to offer a comprehensive
theory of state separation of powers law, much less to suggest that
Rhode Island should adopt a particular distribution of appoint-
ment responsibility. My more modest aim was to point out some of
the potential pitfalls in answering separation of powers questions.
In particular, I have tried to caution against the wholesale adop-
tion of federal doctrine.
As in the domain of individual rights, states commonly follow
federal separation of powers precedent. Indeed, given the link be-
tween independent state constitutional interpretation and the
existence of distinctive state communities, deference to federal law
may be more likely in the separation of powers area. The nature of
separation of powers principles present more possibilities for uni-
versalist pretensions. If Madison and Montesquieu understood
how governmental systems could adapt to human nature, then dis-
tinctive state traditions might only lead astray. To deviate would
be to err.
This essay has suggested how separation of powers might be
understood as a more contingent concept, fostering different distri-
butions of power in different settings and at different times. This
interpretive freedom has its perils. When judges resist following
existing case law, even law of a different system, they open them-
selves to charges of being politically motivated or result ori-
ented. 121 On the other hand, state judges often have intimate
knowledge of the workings of their state's government and of the
practical implications of different arrangements of governmental
authority. Freed from the shackles of federal doctrine (and of state
doctrine developed in a very different historical period), state
judges can use their experience to develop independent and robust
separation of powers principles.
121. See Schapiro, supra note 4, at 422 n.127 (giving examples of independent
interpretation being criticized as unprincipled).
